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Communication of Where an Event 
Occurred by a Gorilla 
(Gorilla gorilla gorilla) 
Megan L. Hoffman 
Florida International 
University 
Episodic-like memory for the "where" component of unique 
events was examined in an adult gorilla (Gorilla gorilla go-
rilla). The gorilla witnessed a unique event, performed by an 
experimenter (e.g. watching an experimenter blow bubbles) 
at one of three locations surrounding his enclosure. After a 4 
to 17 minute retention interval, a tester presented the gorilla 
with photographs of the three locations, which were mounted 
on wooden cards, and asked the gorilla where the event had 
occurred. The gorilla communicated his choice by handing a 
card to the tester and was rewarded if correct. The gorilla was 
significantly above chance at identifying the event location. 
Results suggest that the gorilla was not responding on the basis 
of familiarity by choosing the most recently visited location, 
but choosing the location where the event occurred. 
Episodic memory refers to the ability to 
mentally travel back in time, and consciously 
re-experience events from one's past (Tulving, 
1993; 2002). Schwartz and Evans (2001) have 
argued that the defining features of episodic 
memory are: long memory based on unique 
events from one's past, experiencing feelings 
of pastness when those memories are re-
trieved, and feelings of confidence in those 
memories. Until recently, it was assumed that 
episodic memory was unique to humans 
(Tulving, 2002; Schwartz, in press). A large 
number of memory systems such as working 
memory, procedural memory (or reference 
memory), and long semantic memory have 
been found to operate in non-human animals 
(Mercado, Uyeyama, Pack, a Herman, 1999). 
However, only recently has there been in-
creased research concerning if animals have  
episodic memory similar to humans (Clayton, 
Yu, and Dickinson, 2001; Menzel, 1999; 
Schwartz, Colon, Sanchez, Rodriguez, Et Evans, 
2002; Schwartz, Meissner, Hoffman, Evans, Et 
Frazier, 2003). Because episodic memory 
involves a private conscious experience, ac-
companied by feelings of pastness upon re-
trieval, it is difficult to demonstrate episodic 
memory in non-human animals (Schwartz, in 
press). Unlike humans who can readily report 
their conscious experiences through the use of 
language, most animals are unable to commu-
nicate their conscious experiences to humans. 
Therefore, definitions of episodic-like memory 
have been created to describe the behavioral 
criteria that must be met by non-human ani-
mals, in order to support the hypothesis that 
they are experiencing episodic memory that is 
similar to human episodic memory. 
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Spatial Memory in Great Apes 
Several studies have explored memory 
for the "where" component of unique events 
in great apes, by using simulated foraging 
tasks (Gibeault and MacDonald, 2002; 
MacDonald, 1994, MacDonald and Agnes, 1999; 
Menzel 1973; Tinklepaugh, 1932). MacDonald 
(1994) explored the spatial memory of an 
adult and juvenile gorilla (Gorilla gorilla 
gorilla) using a simulated foraging task. In 
this study, half of the total number of food 
sites in an enclosure were baited with food. A 
gorilla was allowed to enter the enclosure and 
forage freely. After the foraging process was 
complete, the gorilla was encouraged to leave 
the enclosure. After a delay, the same food 
sites were rebaited with food, and the subject 
was reintroduced into the enclosure, and 
allowed to find and consume the food. The 
adult gorilla was accurate at remembering 
which locations had previously contained food 
after retention intervals of 24 hours, and the 
juvenile gorilla was accurate at remembering 
which locations had previously contained food 
after retention intervals of 10 minutes. In a 
similar study by MacDonald and Agnes (1999) 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) also 
exhibited above chance accuracy at remem-
bering which locations had previously con-
tained food after retention intervals of 10 
minutes. 
Tinidepaugh (1932) examined the 
spatial memory of two chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes). A chimpanzee was led into 
several different rooms, and watched as an 
experimenter hid food in one member of a 
pair of containers located in each room. 
Then, the chimpanzee was removed from the 
area, and, after a delay interval, was allowed 
to revisit the rooms and search for the hidden 
food. The chimpanzees were highly accurate 
at remembering which pair of containers 
contained food, even for as many as 10 pairs 
of containers. 
In a similar study, E. Menzel (1973) 
investigated spatial memory in 6 chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes). One chimpanzee witnessed 
food being hidden in 18 different locations in 
an enclosure while the other 5 chimpanzees 
did not observe the food being hidden, and 
thus served as controls. After a 2 minute 
retention interval, all of the chimpanzees 
were allowed to search the enclosure. As was pre-
dicted, the chimpanzee who had observed the 
foods being hidden retrieved the majority of the 
foods compared to the control subjects, suggest-
ing that the observe chimpanzee had extensive 
knowledge of where the foods had been hidden. 
In a follow-up study, Menzel (1973) demonstrated 
that when preferred foods were hidden at some 
locations and less preferred foods were hidden 
at other locations, the observer chimpanzee re-
covered the more preferred foods first, suggest-
ing that the chimpanzee also possessed knowl-
edge of what had been hidden in addition to where 
it was hidden. 
C. Menzel (1999) examined memory for 
unique events in a language-trained chimpanzee 
(Pan troglodytes), Panzee, for both "what" and 
"where" components. Panzee watched as an 
experimenter hid foods and objects in different 
locations outside of her enclosure. Panzee used 
a lexigram keyboard to spontaneously communi-
cate information about what had been hidden, 
and pointed to indicate where the object had been 
hidden, up to 16 hours after the event had took 
place. Using the information Panzee provided, 
experimentally blind testers were able to locate 
the hidden food and objects outside of her en-
closure. Because Panzee was highly accurate 
when reporting the information, this suggests that 
she was able to recall "what" and "where" com-
ponents of unique events. 
Episodic-Like Memory in Birds 
Clayton and Dickinson (1998) proposed 
that episodic memory contains information about 
"what" occurred, "where" it occurred, and 
"when" it occurred. Furthermore, these compo-
nents (what, where, and when) are bound to-
gether in a memory for that event. With this 
criteria in mind, Clayton et al. (2001) examined 
episodic-like memory in food-storing scrub jays 
(Aphelocoma coerulescens) using a caching task 
that required the scrub jays to form integrated 
memories of "what", "where", and "when" in-
formation. The scrub jays were given perishable 
and nonperishable foods, which they were allowed 
to cache in trail-unique locations at different 
times. Later they were allowed to recover the 
foods they cached. It was demonstrated that the 
scrub jays were capable of remembering the lo-
cation of their cache sites, the content of the 
cache sites and the relative time since the items 
were cached. Furthermore, all three components 
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needed to be remembered correctly in order for 
the jays to respond correctly, suggesting that the 
what, where, and when components of caching 
events were bound together in memory. 
Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, and Allen (2001) 
examined episodic-like memory in pigeons (Co-
lumbia livia). Pigeons were trained to peck or 
not peck using a symbolic system. Then, on some 
trials, after a short retention interval, an unex-
pected test was given to the pigeons, requiring 
them to respond as to whether they had just re-
cently pecked or not pecked. The results sug-
gest that pigeons were able to comment on spe- 
cific action events that they had recently per-
formed. However, the retention interval did not 
exceed the limits of working memory, and there-
fore cannot be considered evidence of episodic—
like memory. 
Memory for Action Events in a Dolphin  
A similar study, carried out by Mercado, 
Uyeyama, Pack, and Herman (1999) measured 
memory for recently performed events in a 
bottlenosed dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). The 
dolphin, Elele, was asked through human ges-
tural instruction to perform an action event with 
a specific object. Then on randomly determined 
trials, she was given the gestural sign for "re-
peat" after a short delay interval, instructing her 
to repeat the action she had recently performed. 
Although the delay interval did not require re-
trieval from long memory, the dolphin was able 
to communicate her memory for multiple com-
ponents of an event (the action she performed 
and and the object used) on random tests. 
Palinscopic Memory in a Gorilla: Reference to 
the Past 
Another definition of episodic-like 
memory focuses on the palinscopic nature of 
episodic memory. Tutving and Lepage (2000) 
have argued that episodic memory involves 
"palinscopic" memory (memory that concerns 
the past), rather than "proscopic" memory 
(memory which concerns the present). 
Schwartz (in press) has proposed that episodic 
memory has the following qualities: (1) it must 
be based on trial-unique learning, (2) it re-
quires retrieval from long-term memory, and 
most importantly (3) subjects must comment 
on events that occurred in the past 
(palinscopic memory), rather than display 
knowledge of the current state of the world 
(proscopic memory). With the exception of 
the Mercado et al. (1999) study and the Zentall 
et al. (2001) study, experiments that have 
investigated episodic-like memory have only 
concerned proscopic memory. In these studies 
(e.g. Clayton et aL, 2001), animals only have 
to remember where food is currently located, 
which could be accomplished by semantic 
memory, rather than episodic memory 
(Schwartz, in press). 
In the first study examining palinscopic 
memory at long-term memory retention inter-
vals in non-humans, Schwartz et al. (2002) 
examined episodic-like memory in King, a male 
western lowland gorilla (Gorilla gorilla go-
rilla). In a series of experiments, an experi-
menter presented King with a unique feeding 
event, and after a delay, King was asked what 
he had eaten, and who had given him the 
particular cards, which symbolically repre-
sented the fruits and experimenters used in 
the experiment, and he could use these cards 
to communicate his response to the tester. 
Because the food had been consumed, and the 
experimenter who had presented the food was 
no longer present, King was required to com-
ment on an event that occurred in the past, 
rather than communicate his knowledge of the 
present state of the world. 
King was significantly above chance at 
identifying both the "what" and "who" compo-
nents of trial-unique feeding events, both at 
short retention-intervals of 7 minutes and long 
retention-intervals of 24 hours, both of which 
exceed the limits of working memory and 
require retrieval from long-term memory. In 
another study, Schwartz et al. (2003) demon-
strated that King was significantly above 
chance at identifying familiar, and unfamiliar 
people (who component) and novel objects 
(what component) after short retention of 7 
minutes, which presumably require retrieval 
from long-term memory. The present study 
examined palinscopic memory of where a 
unique event had occurred, after long-term 
memory retention intervals. Because King was 
accurate at remembering both the "what" and 
"where" components of unique past events, 
the hypothesis was that King would be able to 
remember the "where" component of unique 
events and communicate this memory by 





King, a male western lowland gorilla (Go-
rilla gorilla gorilla), served as the subject. At 
the time of the experiment King was 32 years 
old, weighed approximately 227 kg (500 lb), and 
stood approximately 1.5 m (5 ft) tall. King was 
born in Cameroon, but was brought to the United 
States at the age of 2, where he was raised in a 
circus. He was moved to Monkey Jungle in Mi-
ami, Florida 22 years ago, at the age of 10. King 
has been the subject of a study on mirror self 
recognition (Swartz Et Evans, 1994), experiments 
on episodic memory (Schwartz et al., 2002), and 
a study on event memory and misinformation 
effects (Schwartz et aL, 2003). 
Environment and Stimuli 
Environment King's environment at Mon-
key Jungle consisted of an indoor/outdoor 
enclosure, connected by a tunnel to an outdoor 
exhibit. King was tested in the indoor/outdoor 
enclosure from 9:00 - 10:00 in the morning, be-
fore being released into his outdoor exhibit. An 
event was presented at one of three distinctive 
stimulus locations surrounding the indoor/out-
door enclosure: the main cage, the nighthouse, 
or the tunnel gate. Testing for memory of the 
event location was always done in a separate cage 
because it was removed from the three locations. 
During both the presentation and testing phases 
of the experiment, King had access to the entire 
indoor/outdoor enclosure (the main cage, test 
cage, and nighthouse), and could move to an-
other area if he did not want to participate in 
the experiment. 
Stimuli At the time of test King was given 
photographs of alt three locations and could com-
municate where the event had occurred by hand-
ing a photo card back to the tester. The photo-
graphs were taken from King's perspective in-
side the enclosure. The photographs measured 
8.89 cm (3 by 12.70 cm (5n), and were mounted 
behind acrylic panels, on wooden cards measur-
ing 20.32 cm (8") by 13.97 cm (5 by 3.81 cm (1.5"). 
Design and Analysis 
The binomial test was used to determine 
whether King's responses differed from what 
would be predicted by chance. Because King had 
three location cards to choose from, chance per-
formance was assumed to be 33%. 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted an aver- 
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age of two days per week during the month of 
March, April, and May of 2003. An average of 
three trials were run on each day of testing. A 
total of 60 trials were completed, with 20 trials 
at each of the three locations. The trials were 
randomized, so that neither King, nor the tester 
could predict the event location on any given 
trial. 
Presentation Phase King witnessed a 
novel event, performed by a familiar person 
(M.LH., C.A.M., SE, or G.T.), at one of three 
distinct locations: the main cage, the 
nighthouse, or the tunnel gate. The novel 
events included such things as watching an 
experimenter put on a "de Brazza" monkey 
mask and watching an experimenter blow 
bubbles. On some trials, King was given a 
small amount of fruit as an incentive to come 
over to the event location. The event lasted 
approximately 1 to 2 minutes. In order to 
ensure that the tester was experimentally 
blind and unable to cue King to the correct 
answer, the tester was kept out of view of the 
three stimulus locations during the presenta-
tion of the event. After the event was com-
pleted and King had left the location where the 
event had occurred, an experimenter timed 
and recorded any visits King made to the other 
two distractor locations (the two stimulus 
locations where the event was not presented) 
or any subsequent visits he made to the event 
location. 
Testing Phase Five minutes after the event 
had been completed at the event location, the 
tester was asked to test King. However, because 
one of the testers was King's primary trainer, she 
was not always available to test exactly after 
the 5 minute retention interval. The retention 
interval ranged from 4 to 17 minutes, with 6 min-
utes being the average. Before testing King, the 
tester was asked to select the location where 
he/she believed the event had occurred. This 
was done to investigate whether there was a 
correlation between the tester's choice and King s 
response (i.e. whether the tester was inadvert-
ently cueing King to the correct answer). 
The tester then entered King's testing 
area and asked King to come over. Then the tester 
asked King, in English, where he had seen the 
familiar person perform the unique event. The 
tester showed King each of the three photo loca-
tion cards, and placed the cards between the 
bars of the cage. King was asked to take the 
cards and make a response. Handing a card back 
to the tester was scored as a response only if 
King had taken all three cards into his cage, so 
could see all of the cards before making a 
decision. If King made a response before doing 
this, the cards were replaced between the bars 
and he was asked to make a selection again. 
After King made a response, the tester 
called out King's response to an out of view 
experimenter, who then indicated to the tester 
whether King was correct or incorrect. When 
King was correct he was given a food reward 
(an orange, banana, apple, or grapes) which 
was part of his daily diet, as well as verbal 
praise from the tester. King was asked to 
return the location cards to the tester. If 
another trial was scheduled for the day, the 
tester would leave the testing area and an-
other event would be presented. The average 
interval between the time when an event was 
tested for, and the time when the next event 
was presented was an average of 6 minutes. 
Results 
King chose the correct location on 27 of 
60 trials, for an overall accuracy of 45%, which 
was significantly above chance using the 
binomial test, p < .05. Although Kings overall 
rate of accuracy was significantly above 
chance, King exhibited a decline in perfor-
mance throughout the experiment, showing 
significantly above chance performance (60%) 
during the first 20 trials of the experiment, but 
declining to chance performance (38%) during 
the last 40 trials of the experiment 
Performance as a Function of Tester 
B.L.S. did the majority of the testing. B.L.S. 
tested on 39 trials and T.C. tested on 21 trials. 
The testers appeared to be blind to the correct 
location. The tester chose the correct location 
on 20 of 60 trials (33%) which was not different 
from chance guessing using the binomial test, p 
< .05. Although neither tester was above 
chance in predicting the correct location, T.C. 
was more accurate than B.L.S. T.C. chose the 
correct location on 48% of the trials, whereas 
B.L.S. chose the correct location on 26% of the 
trials. Therefore, it appears that one tester; 
although not significantly above chance, was 
more accurate than the other tester at pre- 
dicting the correct location. 
The testers did not appear to be inad- 
vertently cueing King to the correct response. 
King's responses were not correlated with the 
tester's choices. King chose the same location 
as T.C. on 53% of the trials, and King chose the 
same location as B.LS. on 36% of the trials, both 
of which were not significantly above chance. 
However, on the trials in which tester T.C. did 
choose the correct location, King also chose the 
correct location 80% of the time, which was sig-
nificantly above chance. On trials in which B. L.S. 
chose the correct location, King chose the cor-
rect location only 20% of the time. However; on 
the trials in which T.C. did not select the correct 
location, King still chose the correct location 67% 
of the time. King's performance was significantly 
above chance when tested by T.C. (67%), but not 
different from chance when tested by B.L.S. 
(33%). 
Performance as a Function of Event Lo-
cation King was correct on 11 of 20 trials (55%) 
when the tunnel was the event location, which 
was significantly above chance using the bino-
mial test, p .05. However, King was not signifi-
cantly above chance when the event location was 
the nighthouse (45%) or the main cage (35%). King 
chose the tunnel location more frequently (40%) 
than he chose the nighthouse (35%) and the main 
cage (25%) even though the frequency of an event 
occurring at any of the locations was the same 
(33.%). 
Analysis of Retroactive Interference 
Trials in which King visited distractor locations 
after leaving the event location were analyzed, 
in order to determine whether visiting a 
distractor location interfered with King's 
ability to remember the location where the 
event occurred; that is whether King experi-
enced retroactive interference. On 20 of 60 
trials King visited distractor locations after 
leaving the event location. On 17 of these 
trials King visited just one distractor after leav-
ing the event location. On 2 of the trials King 
visited a distractor location and then revisited 
the event location. And on 1 trial King visited 
two distractor locations after leaving the event 
location. On the trials in which King visited one 
or more distractor locations, King chose the event 
location 45% of the time, the recently visited 
distractor location 25% of the time, and an un-
visited distractor location 25% of the time. On 
the only trial in which King visited two distractor 
locations, he chose the event location, despite 
the fact that he had visited all three locations. 
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It appears that King's performance was not af-
fected by retroactive interference, defined as 
memory of subsequent visits after visiting the 
event location. 
Analysis of Proactive Interference Trials 
which were preceded by a previous trial on the 
same day were analyzed, in order to determine 
whether the previous trial location interfered 
with King's memory for the current event loca-
tion; that is whether King experienced proactive 
interference. King's accuracy was not signifi-
cantly above chance for the first trial on any given 
day (35%), or the second trial (40%) using the 
binomial test, p < .05. However; King's perfor-
mance was significantly above chance on the third 
trial; he chose the correct location 60% of the 
time. King's low rate of accuracy for the first 
trials (35%) did not appear to be due to proac-
tive interference from the last trial of the previ-
ous day. On the first trials of a day when King 
was incorrect, he chose the event location from 
the last trial of the previous day on only 23% of 
the trials. It appears that King's performance 
was not affected by proactive interference. 
Discussion 
King demonstrated above chance accu-
racy for communicating palinscopic memory of 
where a unique event had occurred, after a re-
tention interval which presumably requires re-
trieval from long memory. King's responses were 
not affected by visiting subsequent locations af-
ter leaving the event location. When King vis-
ited distractor locations after leaving the event 
location, King still chose the event location the 
majority of the time. On trials in which King 
chose an incorrect location after visiting a 
distractor location, he was no more likely to 
choose the recently visited distractor than an 
unvisited distractor. Both of these findings sug-
gest that King was not simply choosing the most 
recently visited location, but communicating his 
memory for where the event had occurred. 
King's Accuracy for Different Locations  
King demonstrated the highest accuracy for tun-
nel trials, lower accuracy for nighthouse trials, 
and the lowest accuracy for main cage trials. This 
may be a result of the relative saliency of the 
three locations. Before the experiment, King had 
never seen anyone except his trainers at the tun-
nel location, making it a truly memorable loca-
tion. King had spent some time with experiment-
ers in his nighthouse, making it a less novel loca- 
tion, and had frequently spent time with experi-
menters at the main cage location, making it the 
least salient of all of the locations. It appears 
that King's less than optimal level of performance 
throughout the study may have been due to the 
fact that the locations (excluding the tunnel) 
were not novel to King. 
Possibility of Cueing by Testers Both 
testers appeared to be blind to the correct an-
swer; and King's responses were not correlated 
with either of the tester's choices, suggesting 
that King was not being cued by the testers. 
However; when one tester (T.C.) did choose the 
correct location, King chose the correct location 
80% of the time. Although this appears suspect 
at first glance, it cannot be concluded that King 
was being cued by her because if King was pick-
ing up on cues given by the tester, King's re-
sponses and the tester's choices should be highly 
correlated. However; the correlation between 
King's response and T.C. 's choices was not sig-
nificantly above chance. Even on trials in which 
T.C. chose an incorrect location, King was corr-
ect 67% of the time. It appears that King was 
not being cued by T.C. because King was highly 
accurate when being tested by T.C. regardless of 
if she had chosen the correct location or an in-
correct location. 
King's Overall Low Rate of Accuracy Data 
from previous research with King suggests that 
he exhibits higher levels of accuracy and atten-
tion during the beginning of the experiment, and 
declines in accuracy and attention throughout 
the study (Schwartz, personal communication). 
In the current experiment, King's accuracy was 
quite high during the first 20 trials (60%), but his 
performance during the last 40 trials was not sig-
nificantly above chance. In addition, the three 
stimulus locations (excluding the tunnel) were 
not particularly novel to King, and this may have 
affected his performance. Due to excess weight 
gain, King was put on a diet during the experi-
ment, thus reducing the amount of fruit that 
could be given as reinforcement, which is cer-
tainly a factor that could have influenced King's 
motivation to perform well. 
Another factor that could have influenced 
King's accuracy is the nature of the task itself. 
King has been a captive gorilla all of his life, 
being a former circus performer and currently a 
zoo resident at Monkey Jungle. He acquired an 
outdoor habitat only 2 years before this study 
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began. Compared to gorillas in the wild and cap-
tive gorillas who have been engaged in enrich-
ment activities that promote their natural for-
aging becomplex environment. However, King 
has had many experiences with objects and 
people during his time at Monkey Jungle. This 
might explain why King was more accurate at 
remembering "what" and "who" components of 
trial-unique events in the Schwartz et al. 
study(2003), than remembering "where" infor-
mation in the current study. 
Episodic-Like Memory The present study 
replicates the Schwartz et al. (2003) finding of 
palinscopic memory at long-term memory reten-
tion intervals in the gorilla, King. However, unl-
ike the Schwartz et al. (2003) study, King's re-
sponses in the current study were not based on 
trial-unique stimuli; in the present study the same 
three locations were used throughout the experi-
ment. Although the current study does not ful-
fill the trial-unique requirement for episodic-like 
memory, the results do suggest that in addition 
to remembering "what" and "who" information, 
King is also capable of remembering "where" 
information after long-term memory retention 
intervals. The fact that King was more likely to 
choose the event location than a distractor loca-
tion, even after visiting up to two distractor lo-
cations, supports the claim that King's responses 
are not based on familiarity, but that King is com-
municating information about a past event. 
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